Indian armed forces are 3 rd largest military force and World’s
largest standing volunteer army. But in 21st century numbers alone doesn't matter, if we need a total supremacy over enemy, we need modern equipment and a robust chain of command.
If we are having a strong chain of command and a decision taking body,
we will clearly have an advantage over enemy because, this will help us to
execute our missions, swiftly and in more organised manner, with the optimum
usage of our resources.
The Kargil war reflected the weakness of our decision taking body, which
impacted our missions as well as reduced the number of choices we had at that
time. Even though we succeeded in foiling Pakistani attempt to internationalize
Kashmir issue, it was more a wake up call for the government to restructure our command chain. Kargil review committee submitted their report on Feb 23,
2000.The cabinet committee on security later appointed a group of ministers to
study the report. The group of ministers held a total of 27 meetings and in
order to facilitate their work, it had set up four task forces, one each on
Intelligence apparatus, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of
Defence. The group of ministers submitted their report to Prime Minister on Feb
26, 2000.
Arjun Singh committee on Defence
management and Naresh Chandra committee recommended creation of Chief of Defence staff with four main functions;
1. Providing
single point military advice
2. Administer
strategic forces
3. Ensuring
Jointness in the armed forces
4. Enhance
planning process through Interservice coordination and prioritizing. $
CCS considered Group of ministers
Report on May 11, 2001 and implemented all recommendations
contained except the creation of a Chief of Defence
Staffs, Mainly because of the fear that CDS may become more
powerful than Cabinet Secretary.
The Kargil Review committee asserted
need for establishing a Committee of Chief of Staffs and a permanent chairman
to this committee, but the government was reluctant because of the fear of
losing political power over the military, which may lead to a possible coup.
This lead to the establishment of COSC without a permanent chairman, at present
.
1. The COSC
members include Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and
Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC) who is a non-voting member.
2. The
position of the chairman devolves on the longest serving chief of staff and
rotates amongst the chiefs of service.
3. Currently serves as a advisory board and a
forum for service chiefs to discuss matters having a bearing on the activities
of the services.
Why We Need
a Permanent Chief?
India is
situated in a hostile neighbourhood, with possible risk of attack from two or more fronts. As we are having a vast coastline and mountainous terrain,it’s essential to have a good understanding of assets available with three forces and use them wisely in case of conflict to get a
desired outcome with usage of optimum resources which will in turn reduce causalities as well as cost of war. For this we
need a much deeper understanding and coordination between three forces, which we lacked at the time of Kargil conflict.
Currently the three forces are having three independent decision taking mechanisms, through COSC helped to lay down a platform for discussion and sharing doctrines and strategic views of three service chiefs, lack of a permanent chairman or a independent chief to assess and take
further decisions, weakening
the purpose of this committee
Some of the roles may give to permanent chairman COSC;
1. Exercise
administrative control over nuclear arsenal.
2. Head a separate
joint Special Forces command.
3. Ensure Jointness
of armed forces.
4. Exercise
administrative control over all joint service commands, such as Andaman Nicobar
Command; Strategic Forces Command; Cyber Command (when created); Aerospace
command (When created).
5. Prioritise
allocation of capital budgets for acquiring vital capabilities for armed forces.
6. Prepare annual defence operational status
reports.
7. Will be an
invitee to Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and National Security Council
(NSC). ^
Joint
Chiefs of Staffs (United States)
The Joint
Chiefs of Staff consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau.*
The
collective body of the JCS is headed by the Chairman (or the Vice Chairman in
the Chairman's absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings.
Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over
duties as the Chiefs of Military Services. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council
(NSC), however, all JCS members are by law military advisers, and they may
respond to a request or voluntarily submit, through the Chairman, advice or
opinions to the President, the Secretary of Defense, or NSC.
The
executive authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has changed. In World War II,
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff acted as executive agents in dealing with
theater and area commanders, but the original National Security Act of 1947 saw
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as planners and advisers, not as commanders of
combatant commands. In spite of this, the 1948 Key West Agreement allowed
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as executive agents for unified
commands, a responsibility that allowed the executive agent to originate direct
communication with the combatant command. Congress abolished this authority in
a 1953 amendment to the National Security Act.*
Today,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant
forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986: "The Secretaries of the
Military Departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to
unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those
commands..."; the chain of command "runs from the President to the
Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the
combatant command."*
Role of Chairman to JCS
The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
identifies the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking
member of the Armed Forces. As such, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
is the principal military adviser to the President. He may seek the advice of
and consult with the other JCS members and combatant commanders. When he
presents his advice, he presents the range of advice and opinions he has
received, along with any individual comments of the other JCS members.*
Under the
DOD Reorganization Act, the Secretaries of the Military Departments assign all
forces to combatant commands except those assigned to carry out the mission of
the Services, i.e., recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, service, mobilize,
demobilize, administer and maintain their respective forces. The chain of
command to these combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense directly to the commander of the combatant command. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff may transmit communications to the commanders of the
combatant commands from the President and Secretary of Defense but does not
exercise military command over any combatant forces.*
The Act
also gives to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff some of the functions
and responsibilities previously assigned to the corporate body of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The broad functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are set forth in Title 10, United States Code, and detailed in DOD
Directive 5100.1. In carrying out his duties, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff consults with and seeks the advice of the other members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, as he considers appropriate.*
Goldwater-Nicolas Act of 1986
The
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was implemented on 1
October 1986. It has been called the most significant Defense policy change
since the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols gave us a globe
divided into Combatant Commands, each with a CINC (until 2002, when they became
COCOMs). It also made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principle
military advisor to the President, whereas previously the Service Chiefs had a
much larger role in providing that advice.# This simplified command chain by giving orders directly
to Combatant Commandants
 |
| basic structure |
According to Goldwater-Nicolas act chairman is
the principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out his functions, duties, and
responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with
and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the
commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands. And it defined the
fuction of chairman as follows %
(a) Planning; Advice;
Policy Formulation. Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following:
(1) Strategic
Direction. Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing
for the strategic direction of the armed forces.
(2) Strategic Planning.
(A) Preparing strategic plans,
including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary
of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be
effective.
(B) Preparing joint logistic and
mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommending the assignment
of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance
with those logistic and mobility plans.
(C) Performing net assessments to
determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its
allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.
(3) Contingency Planning;
Preparedness.
(A) Providing for the preparation and
review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President
and the Secretary of Defense.
(B) Preparing joint logistic and
mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the
assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in
accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.
(C) Advising the Secretary on
critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower,
logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of
contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths
on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.
(D) Establishing and maintaining,
after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant
commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command
to carry out missions assigned to the command.
(4) Advice on Requirements, Programs,
and Budget.
(A) Advising the Secretary, under
section 163(b)(2) of this title, on the priorities of the requirements
identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.
(B) Advising the Secretary on the
extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the
military departments and other components of the Department of Defence for a
fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with
the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified
combatant commands.
(C) Submitting to the Secretary
alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected
resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary, in order to achieve
greater conformance with the priorities referred to in clause (B).
(D) Recommending to the Secretary, in
accordance with section 166 of this title, a budget proposal for activities of
each unified and specified combatant command.
(E) Advising the Secretary on the
extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area
of manpower conform with strategic plans.
(F) Assessing military requirements
for defence acquisition programs.
(5) Doctrine, Training, and
Education.
(A) Developing doctrine for the joint
employment of the armed forces.
(B) Formulating policies for the
joint training of the armed forces.
(C) Formulating policies for
coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed
forces.
(6) Other Matters.
(A) Providing for representation of
the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
(B) Performing such other duties as
may be prescribed by law or by the President or the Secretary of Defence.%
By limiting service chiefs to advisory role, US
government managed to get a tight grip over the military. The Indian government
must learn lessons from this model. Sometimes too much political control over
military can produce undesired outcomes, to contain it we need to make a
balanced plan, with a simple and robust decision taking mechanism and in turn
enhance the capability of our armed forces in fighting a war .
Sources:
% http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm
* http://www.jcs.mil/
^ $ http://www.spsmai.com/military/?id=2972&q=A-relook-at-the-Chief-of-Defence-Staff-/-Permanent-Chairman-COSC
http://blog.usni.org/2011/07/14/goldwater-nichols-at-25-success-or-failure
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=15088679
http://ids.nic.in/organisation.htm
http://media.newindianexpress.com/Modi-DefenceLeaders1PTI.jpg/2014/10/17/article2482243.ece/alternates/w620/Modi-DefenceLeaders1PTI.jpg
http://www.mod.nic.in/forms/Sublink1.aspx?lid=1544&Id=56
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/744b0f7d-4a3f-4473-8a27-c5b444c2ea27/Has-It-Worked--The-Goldwater-Nichols-Reorganizatio
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=goldwater_nichols_defense_reorganization_act_1
